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ETHNIC POLITICAL POWER 
IN A MACHINE CITY 
Chicago's Poles at Rainbow's End 
TOMASZ INGLOT 
University of Wisconsin-Madison 
JOHN P. PELISSERO 
Loyola University Chicago 
Machine politics in Chicago has been described as a successful example of exchange theory in 
which political party members received benefits in return for loyalty to the party. In 1988, Erie 
rejected the rainbow theory of machine politics, arguing that the Irish received the lion's share 
of political benefits while other white-ethnic groups, such as Poles, were given limited and often 
symbolic rewards. These authors show that Chicago's Poles were not fully incorporated into the 
rainbow of groups that benefited from and supported the machine. This led to a pattern of 
independence in voting and lends considerable support to Erie's supply-side model of machine 
politics. 
Ethnic politics is a feature of most large U.S. cities' political environments. 
Major white-ethnic groups have historically waged a battle for political 
power with other white ethnics, African-Americans, and Hispanics. The 
white-ethnic population in many cities today has yielded control to African-
Americans and Hispanics, who wield significant power from city hall to the 
courthouse to the board of education. Because ethnicity has been determined 
to have a great impact on voting in many cities (Wolfinger 1965; Parenti 
1967), a case analysis of a particular ethnic group can help to clarify the 
reasons why such communities achieve varied degrees of influence and 
recognition in city politics. Although an ethnic group can use sheer numbers 
and bloc voting to achieve considerable influence in a city, many small 
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groups acquire vast power. For example, despite being a minority among 
other ethnics, the Irish were able to dominate the Democratic party in 
Chicago because of their English-language advantage and earlier entry into 
the political game. In contrast, the Poles have never held as much power in 
Chicago or in most other cities dominated by Irish machines (Erie 1988). 
Irish and Polish candidates for office have often touted their ethnic identity 
as one way to have an impact on election results (pinderhughes 1987,244). 
Not only in times of political turmoil but also during the relative stability of 
the pluralist government system, ethnic groups influence the urban power 
structure, frequently as strong participants in the bargaining process. In our 
examination of Chicago, we show that the Polish-American vote in this city 
has been independent because of the inability or unwillingness of the Irish 
machine leaders to provide more than symbolic rewards for the Poles. Rather 
than being incorporated among a rainbow of voters in an Irish-dominated 
machine, the Poles were offered fewer incentives to be loyal to the machine 
over time, often resulting in unsuccessful Polish shows of independence. We 
examine the political power of Poles from the 1950s Daley-machine era to 
the present post-machine period. Through this study we try to show that 
Polish Americans in Chicago were on the short end of the exchange arrange-
ments in the machine, receiving few rewards, especially as their indepen-
dence from the Democratic party expanded during the Daley era. 
THE CONTEXT FOR ETHNIC POLITICAL STUDIES 
Ethnic politics in American cities has been an important research area for 
decades. Two streams of research are relevant to understanding ethnic poli-
tics. The first is the ethnic-voting-behavior model. The persistence of ethnic 
voting over the years gathered significant attention from political scientists. 
The assimilation theory of ethnic voting and its assumption about the de-
creasing importance of ethnic voting in proportion to a group's assimilation 
into the American mainstream was challenged by Wolfinger (1965). He 
argued that "the mobilization of ethnic political resources" (p. 903) was a 
more valid description of ethnic politics. He suggested that the ethnic-vote 
phenomenon becomes stronger among the second and third generations of 
voters. The more members that a particular group has among the middle class 
and in a political party, the stronger the support for their own ethnic candidate 
will be. Further, the first important candidacy for an office has lasting influ-
ence on the voting patterns of the generations to come (p. 905). D. Pienkos 
(1982) pointed out that during the 1960s, the new ethnicity movement had 
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significant influence on the Polish-American community. He emphasized 
this as one of the reasons for the preservation of the Polish ethnic conscious-
ness of the new generation into the 1980s. Parenti (1967), on the other hand, 
focused on the difference between acculturation and assimilation. He sug-
gested that ethnic or minority groups are not assimilating. These groups only 
accept certain elements of the national American culture while still "behav-
ing as ethnics politically" (pp. 725-26). What little has been written about 
Poles suggests that the Wolfinger view may be correct: Polish Americans still 
vote for Poles if they have the opportunity to do so. 
The second area of inquiry that bears on this study is that of machine 
politics and the role of groups in political machines. The theories of machine 
politics offer cOQtrasting views on the political treatment of ethnic groups in 
machine cities. To understand the role of a group, such as Polish Americans, 
in big-city politics, one must analyze the political power of Poles from the 
contrasting views of rainbow theorists (Dahl 1961; Merton 1968) and inter-
governmental theorists (Erie 1988). The rainbow theorists argue that the 
machine was a functional body (Merton 1968) that pursued political incor-
poration of many ethnic groups in the political party. In return for loyalty to 
the political party, machines delivered a variety of social services to ethnic 
immigrants, in addition to jobs, friendship, and opportunities for social and 
economic advancement. The rainbow coalition of mostly white-ethnic 
groups was sustained through a virtually endless supply of "municipal gold" 
(Erie 1988) that the machines controlled. This exchange system seemingly 
guaranteed ethnic loyalty to the machine. 
Erie (1988) persuasively argued, however, that the Irish were the major 
beneficiaries of the machine rewards. Cities had very limited supplies of 
rewards that could be dispensed; these often went first to the Irish, and the 
remaining incentives were distributed to ethnic groups on the basis of a 
group's contribution to a minimal winning coalition for the machine. In 
particular, later-arriving immigrants, such as those from Eastern Europe, 
including Poland, received far less valuable rewards from the machine than 
did the Irish. Symbolic rewards and collective legislative benefits were the 
norm for these groups, not jobs or political positions. This theory is based on 
the limited supply of benefits that the machine could dispense, which was 
far less than the rainbow theorists might have one believe. 
We apply the theories of machine politics to our study of Chicago's Poles 
in an effort to sort out the relative importance of this group to the Irish-
dominated Democratic machine and its power within the city. We seek to 
understand the political incorporation of Polish Americans in Chicago's 
machine, especially during Richard 1. Daley's reign (1953-76) and the years 
immediately following it. 
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POLES AND THE DALEY MACHINE 
The Chicago Democratic machine was conceived by Irish political bosses 
in the late 19th century and was actually born as a modern-day citywide 
machine in the 1930s. Anton Cermak, a Bohemian, brought the machine to 
power with his election as mayor in 1931. He is often credited as the genius 
behind the machine's ethnically balanced slate making that incorporated so 
many diverse ethnic and religious groups into the Chicago Democratic party 
(Granger and Granger 1987,93). Cermak accommodated a rainbow of inter-
ests in his machine-doling out positions on the ballot among the much-
needed population groups of the city (see Gottfried 1962,222-36). In fact, 
during this early stage of the Chicago machine's development, inclusion of 
more than just the Irish was a key to its electoral success. The Irish were 
favored in municipal employment at least as early as 1900, when 31 % of city 
jobs were held by Irish (Erie 1988,60). Yet, early bosses like Roger Sullivan 
and George Brennan recognized the importance of new immigrants, includ-
ing Poles, to the electoral victory of the Democratic party in the 19OO-20s' 
period. Hence they worked to naturalize and register large numbers of Poles, 
as well as other white immigrants (Erie 1988, 12,78), as a basis of the group's 
participation in political affairs. By 1930, Poles constituted about 12% of the 
city's population, and Cermak advanced Polish political fortunes by provid-
ing Poles with representation on the party's slated ticket (Kantowicz 1975). 
Of Cook County's top political positions, 6% were given to Poles (Illinois 
Secretary of State 1931). 
POLITICAL JOBS 
Poles would not receive access to most major power positions in local 
government. As Pinderhughes (1987, 9) noted, 
the Chicago machine was a static hierarchy ruled by the Irish, managed at the 
intermediate levels by loyal but restive European ethnics such as Poles, Ger-
mans and other Eastern Europeans [and] ... at the bottom of this hierarchy 
were the blacks who controlled the black areas. 
The Irish would pick a Pole for a prominent position, such as city clerk, to 
encourage Polish voting for the machine slate (Rakove 1975,96). However, 
not just any loyal Pole was acceptable to the machine for major positions, as 
Rakove (p. 97) pointed out, 
A Pole who has been active in the Polish National Alliance, for example, would 
have much more attraction to the slatemakers than would a Polish lawyer who 
has had no interest in or concern with Polish affairs in the city or the county. 
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Figure 1: Polish and Irish Population and Political Positions, Chicago, 1931-
1965 
SOURCES: City of Chicago (1976); Illinois Secretary of State (1931,1935,1939,1945,1949, 
1955, 1959, 1965). 
Figure 1 shows that early in the Chicago machine's development, the Irish 
established dominance over top elective and appointed positions in Chicago 
and Cook County governments. 1 The Irish population at the beginning of the 
machine era was 6%, and by 1965, it had dropped to less than 2%. The Polish 
population was at 12% in 1931 and dropped to 7% by the end of this period.2 
But Poles achieved less representational equity when comparing their share 
of the population to their share of political jobs, and they received far fewer 
jobs relative to the Irish. Poles typically acquired more jobs in county offices 
than in city offices. Figure 1 indicates that the proportion of top county 
political positions held by Poles grew modestly from 1931 to 1955 (when 
Daley became mayor). It then dropped to a low of 4% by 1965. The Polish 
proportion of city jobs was very low throughout this period and only ap-
proached the population share in the 1960s. The Irish, on the other hand, 
never had less than 23% of city jobs and 25% of county positions. By the 
Daley era the Irish held more than 40% oftop political positions in both Cook 
County and Chicago in spite of their population share having dropped to 4%. 
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By the 1950s, when RichardJ. Daley came to power, the Democratic party 
was entrenched in Chicago politics and had the use of limited resources to 
maintain the machine. For instance, the number of patronage jobs was 
reduced by 12,000 by Daley's predecessor (O'Connor 1975, 85), civil service 
reform was instituted, and the public employee unions and minority groups 
began to pressure for a greater share of the machines's resources (Grimshaw 
1982, 63-65). Although the machine had 18,000-20,000 patronage jobs 
throughout the Daley years, few of these were given to groups in large 
numbers other than the Irish. 
LIMITED RESOURCES 
The party only engaged in selective registration and mobilization of 
middle-class white groups like Poles (Erie 1988, 23) because at least two 
circumstances had changed in Chicago. First, the Irish hold on political power 
was solid, and they had mobilized a selective, minimal winning coalition in 
their machine "rainbow." By limiting political rewards to the essential 
coalition, the party was able to manage its limited resources effectively (Erie 
1988). The party depended on loyalty as a first principle of party membership 
(Rakove 1984), but the Poles were among the more restive groups-those 
whose loyalty to the party could not be guaranteed. The second change 
occurred among Poles and other white-ethnic groups who no longer were 
interested in the basic rewards for party membership. As middle-class home 
owners, many Poles were among the machine's traditional supporters who 
opposed property tax increases, welfare services, and patronage jobs-
staples of machine operations (Erie 1988, 245). Individual Poles sought to 
protect their investment in a home (Granger and Granger 1987, 138) and were 
satisfied to receive minimal benefits from the machine-especially low taxes 
and segregated neighborhoods. Daley and the other Irish leaders granted 
these limited resources to permit continued Irish control over the key power 
positions of local government (Erie 1988,246). Figure 1 displays a clear bias 
toward the Irish in major political positions, supporting Erie's thesis. 
Other evidence supports the view that the Irish machine had limited 
resources that had to be controlled to maintain the machine. For example, 
when one examines the number of patronage positions at the height of the 
Daley regime, one sees that the Irish clearly needed more than positions in 
the city of Chicago to reward supporters. The Shakman court case3 testimony 
revealed that the city and park district patronage numbered about 15,500 
positions, which was not enough for the Democratic faithful. Hence it was 
necessary for the party to control the elected and top appointive positions in 
532 URBAN AFFAIRS QUARTERLY I June 1993 
virtually all areas of the Cook County government to harvest another 6,000 
jobs (Erie 1988, 153). The intergovernmental dependency was also quite 
established within the machine. To maintain the organization the Chicago 
machine needed judges and positions in state government departments such 
as the Secretary of State's office, the state highway department, and the state 
of Illinois' massive Chicago-based government offices (Rakove 1975, 112; 
Warden and Tatro 1988). Moreover, the machine depended on the federal and 
state governments for fiscal assistance and programs that could be used to 
reward the party faithful. These intergovernmental programs provided jobs, 
contracting money, and infrastructure improvements for the machine to 
award to friends, supporters, and the areas of the city in which they lived. 
The state and federal governments were especially helpful to the machine 
with highway, public works, airport, public housing, and social programs and 
policies. Without this intergovernmental support the machine's resources 
would have been limited. 
WARD VOTING PATTERNS 
Another way to look at the possibility of Polish inclusion in the Windy 
City rainbow is to examine several mayoral elections of this period in which 
Daley faced a formidable Polish challenger. In the 1955 Democratic primary 
and in the 1963 general election, Daley was opposed by Polish leader 
Benjamin Adamowski. In 1955, Adamowski challenged Daley and incum-
bent mayor Martin Kennelly in the Democratic mayoral primary. Adamowski 
had been led to believe that he was destined to hold political power in Chicago 
someday, and he aspired to be the first Polish mayor (Royko 1971,51,90). 
Although he did not expect to win the primary, he wanted to show the ma-
chine that the Polish voters were tired of being ignored and would demon-
strate their independence from the party by voting for him (Royko 1971,90). 
Adamowski lost decisively, polling only 15% of the vote. Yet, as shown in 
Figure 2, he carried a majority of votes in four wards with large Polish 
neighborhoods (Zikmund 1982,32-33). Wards 32, 33, and 35 on the North-
west Side were much more independent than the Polish areas of the South-
west Side, where Adamowski won only the 12th ward. This primary was an 
early indication to Daley of the growing independence of the Polish North-
west Side. Although he carried six wards with large Polish populations, 
nearly all were in the southwest or southeast working-class areas of the city, 
where Poles' first concern was always jobs and security (although many were 
suspicious of Irish politicians) (Pacyga 1991, 199-201). 
In addition, almost the entire Northwest Side, with a large Polish popula-
tion in many wards, especially the 41st, voted for Mayor Kennelly. Two other 
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Figure 2: Voting Results of the 1955 Democratic Primary and Location of Polish 
Population 
SOURCES: Zikmund (1982, 33); Polish-language newspaper reports. 
southern Polish wards, 7 and 13, also voted for the incumbent. In effect, Daley 
lost the white vote in this election, and Poles were the largest ethnic group. 
The Polish wards happened to be those that, more than any other, rejected 
the chair of the Democratic party machine. Without a strong turnout by the 
African-American and white working dass-inner-city voters-Daley would 
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not have prevailed in this primary election. Daley learned two lessons from 
this election. One was that Polish wards could not be counted on to support 
the machine-backed candidate anymore. The other was that the party's 
limited resources should not be given to groups that are not loyal to the 
machine. Because the machine needed only to maintain a minimum winning 
coalition, party benefits did not have to be given to Polish Americans if they 
were not essential to an electoral victory. 
Adamowski ran again in the 1963 general election, this time on the Re-
publican ticket. Despite the popularity of Daley and the Democrats in this 
city, Adamowski polled 44% of the general-election vote. As shown in Fig-
ure 3, Daley lost 18 wards, including nearly all of the Polish Northwest Side 
of the city. This ,election reminded the Democrats again that the Poles were 
independent. Adamowski's race is cited as the time when the "Polishness" 
of the candidate was considered a very important factor for some Polish 
voters (Rakove 1975, 151). Daley continued to hang on to areas where the 
machine was strong: wards 11 (his own), 14, 22, 25, 26, and 32, each with 
large Polish working-class populations. He lost some of the Southwest Side 
wards and the Northwest Side Polish wards with more middle-class charac-
teristics and less dependence on the machine. In fact, many of the Polish 
Northwest Side wards increasingly had been voting Republican in previous 
elections (see Skogan 1976).4 But during the 1930s, when Cermak came to 
power, the wards with large Polish populations consistently voted for the 
machine candidate in general elections. 
Zikmund (1982, 40) pointed out that even though it is impossible to 
determine today how Polish Americans voted in this election, Adamowski's 
failure to win all Polish wards is still surprising. It is important to note that 
ethnicity came into conflict here with the traditional loyalty of many Poles 
to the Democratic party. Some Poles voted for Polish candidates in this 
election, not machine candidates. The supply-side limits on benefits for Poles 
imposed by the Daley machine had shown Polish leaders that they had little 
reason to support an Irish machine's candidate when another choice was 
viable. As Figure 1 reveals, although the Poles were attaining major political 
positions in the county and city in relative proportion to their share of the 
population of Chicago, the Irish were attaining far more. The Irish were but 
2% of the city's popUlation, and they still had 38% of the top city political 
jobs.5 Widespread defection of Democratic voters from Daley (many Polish 
Americans included) was more evident when comparing the overwhelming 
victory of the Democratic city clerk candidate, John C. Marcin (a Polish 
American), over his opponent. Again, Erie's (1988, 157) research is instruc-
tive on this election: 
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Figure 3: Voting Results of the 1963 General Election and Location of Polish 
Population 
SOURCES: Zikmund (1982,38); Cit)' of Chicago (1963). 
In the 1963 general election, Republican candidate Benjamin Adamowski 
charged that Daley had fattened the city payroll at the expense of homeowners. 
Heavily taxed property owners responded, particularly Polish-Americans also 
incensed by the failure of the Irish to share power. Adamowski won the 
middle-class ethnic wards on the North Side, receiving a majority of the white 
vote citywide. Daley narrowly defeated the Polish challenger only because of 
a massive black vote in machine-controlled South Side wards. 
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The African-American voter turnout in 1963 was 50% in five key African-
American machine wards (2, 3, 4, 6, 20), and Daley received 77% of this 
vote (Kemp and Lineberry 1982, 16). 
The rainbow theory cannot explain this outcome. Only a more supply-side 
thesis provides adequate explanation. The machine limited the rewards avail-
able to Poles (Figure 1), failing to capture their leaders' or voters' loyalty. 
This ethnic revolt demonstrated the failure of the Democratic party, in 
general, and the Chicago machine to embrace the Polish Americans of the 
city. For the middle-class Polish voters, the Irish machine had little to offer, 
and this growing middle class had little reason to accept lower-tier patronage 
jobs and welfare services as payments for loyal machine voting (see Erie 
1988, 164; Kleppner 1985, 84; Kemp and Lineberry 1982, 18). 
An analysis of voting patterns in the Northwest and Southwest Polish 
wards is revealing in two other Daley victories. In the 1967 general election, 
Daley faced another Polish-American Republican challenger, John L. Waner. 
The incumbent mayor easily won all wards. However, his victory in the 
southwestern wards was much more decisive than in northwest Chicago. 
Daley's average in the southwest wards was over 70%, whereas in the 
northwest wards, his support was below 60% in several cases. In the 1975 
general election, Daley won over 80% in the 11th, 12th, 13th, and 14th wards 
of the Southwest Side but only 68% in the 35th, 41st, and 45th wards of the 
Northwest Side. It is instructive to note that the Southwest Side was still 
dominated by Irish bosses whose influence extended to wards with large 
Polish populations. 
Mayor Daley continually tried to win additional confidence among the 
Poles. He backed ally Roman Pucinski for a seat in the U.S. House of 
Representatives in 1958. Pucinski won with the Irish machine's support and 
became a vocal Polish leader in the Daley alliance. As a gesture of loyalty to 
the Democratic party machine in 1972, Pucinski gave up his House seat to 
make room for another of Daley's favorites, Frank Annunzio, who had lost 
his congressional seat through reapportionment. Pucinski eventually became 
alderman of the 41st ward, but the Polish community remained dissatisfied 
with his "demotion." (The Irish were always more interested in local office 
in Chicago; Poles were less so.) 
This disappointment with the machine and the growing independence of 
many Poles surfaced again after Daley's death, when Pucinski made his own 
bid for mayor in the 1977 Democratic primary. He received substantial 
support from divergent Polish interest groups that were less visible and less 
powerful when the machine was strong but that came forth to back Polish 
candidates during difficult periods of political transition and turmoil. 
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In the primary Pucinski opposed Acting Mayor Michael Bilandic, the 
machine-backed candidate, and State Senator Harold Washington. Bilandic 
won the nomination by the narrowest of margins, 51.1 %. Pucinski's showing 
was strong-33% of the Democratic vote-butthis was less than Adamowski 
had polled 14 years earlier. Figure 4 reveals that the seven wards that he 
carried were all Polish Northwest Side wards. He did not receive a plurality 
in the Polish wards of the South Side. Because Pucinski received a majority 
or plurality in seven Northwest Side wards and was the alderman of the 41 st 
ward, this vote seems to fit the pattern of a "friends-and-neighbors" vote 
(Zikmund 1982; Key 1950,37-41). This primary election does not represent 
a wholesale revolt against the machine (since the Southwest Side wards went 
for Bilandic), qut it does support the view that the machine had few resources 
to offer to the middle-class Polish wards that had grown so restive and 
independent in their voting. (These wards also have large numbers of German 
and Italian residents; therefore, the independence of the vote in this ward 
must be attributed to a combination of Polish and other white-ethnic voters.) 
Polish power was less significant than it could have been had all Poles united 
behind a well-respected Polish leader. Many Poles appeared to have stayed 
loyal to the machine that had found a few rewards to appease them-notably, 
lower taxes, segregated neighborhoods and schools, and good services to 
their neighborhoods (Erie 1988, 164). 
POLISH POWER IN THE POST-MACHINE ERA 
A number of political groups often promote or support Polish Americans 
for city positions today, including the Polish-American Police Association 
and the Advocate Society, which represents Polish lawyers and sponsors 
Polish-American judges. The list of judges in the city of Chicago usually 
contains about 20 or so Polish names. For example, it is not uncommon in 
the city traffic court to hear Polish-speaking judges, lawyers, and police 
officers. One of the oldest Polish-American social organizations-the Polish 
Women's Alliance--oftenjoins in sponsoring political candidates (Dziennik 
Zwiazkowy 1987a, 1). Among other Polish interest groups, the Chicago 
Society, an organization of Polish business people, and the Polish-American 
Business Association are able to provide substantial financial support for an 
ethnic candidate. Further, the Polish-American Political League, founded for 
the purpose of electing Adamowski in 1963, is still influential and helped 
organize Pucinski's mayoral campaign in 1977. Yet, the success of these 
interest groups in promoting Polish goals has been largely limited to either 
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Figure 4: Pucinski Electorate by Ward, 1977 Democratic Primary for Mayor and 
Location of Polish Population 
SOURCES: A. T. Pienkos (1978, Appendix Ig); City of Chicago (1973). 
symbolic actions (such as renaming streets after Polish heroes or establishing 
Polish Constitution Day) or the support of Polish-American representation 
in certain middle-level positions in the Chicago power structure. This further 
supports the limited supply-side thesis of Polish politics in Chicago. 
The Polish voting community was mobilized in February 1987, when 
Mayor Harold Washington endorsed a Hispanic candidate, Gloria Chevere, 
over incumbent Walter Kozubowski for city clerk. The Polish community 
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reacted angrily to this attempt to remove a "symbol" of Polish power. The 
Polish National Alliance (PNA), the Polish Roman Catholic Union, many 
Polish politicians, and smaller Polish-American organizations gathered their 
forces in support of Kozubowski. During a joint meeting of these Polish 
groups, PNA president Aloysus Mazewski stressed that 
the two candidates, Walter Kozubowski for city clerk and Roman Pucinski for 
alderman of the 41 st Ward are especially important for Polonia in the upcoming 
elections. They are proven, qualified people and what is most important, they 
come from our ethnic group and we must do everything we can to make sure 
that they defeat their opponents . . .. We cannot let ourselves be ignored and 
pushed around. The widespread participation of us all in the election on 
February 24, especially our voting for the Polish-American candidates of the 
Democratic Party, will be the best evidence for all who take us for granted that 
Polonia will not let anyone ignore it and will show solidarity in support of its 
candidates. (Authors' translation from Dziennik Zwiazkowy 1987a) 
Kozubowski, a political protege of 14th ward Irish leader Edward Burke, had 
been rather reluctant to get involved with the Polish community in Chicago 
before 1983, but since the election of Washington, he had been showing new 
interest in the Polish community by accepting most invitations to attend 
Polonia's cultural and social events such as the Polish Constitution Day cele-
brations (Dziennik Zwiazkowy 1987b). Kozubowski was renominated by a 
small margin-he polled 49% of the Democratic vote compared to Chevere's 
43%. This primary battle must be understood in the context of Chicago's 
changing racial politics. It was important for the African-American mayor to 
reach out to the growing Hispanic population and to offer this community an 
important position in the Chicago government. Poles had not supported 
Washington in his 1983 election, and Poles were unlikely to support him this 
time around. Washington would lose few white-ethnic voters because he 
sought to dump Kozubowski from the ticket. 
PUTTING THE POLISH EXPERIENCE IN CONTEXT 
Our research on Polish politics in Chicago was undertaken to understand 
two questions related to urban politics. First, did Chicago's Poles continue 
to vote for Polish candidates as the Polish population became more middle 
class? Second, were Polish benefits from, and support of, the Chicago 
machine consistent with the rainbow theory of machine politics? The answer 
to the first question seems to be a qualified yes. Voting results across wards 
from 1955 to 1977 showed thatthe Polish wards of the Northwest Side tended 
to vote for Polish candidates rather than for the machine candidate for mayor. 
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These wards are more middle-class communities, with a fair number of 
German and Italian residents along with the Poles. The ward voting behavior 
was defiant of the machine (1963), independent, and neighborly (1977). In 
contrast, the Southwest Side wards with large Polish populations tended to 
reject the Polish candidate and follow the lead of their Irish ward bosses. 
Although these southern wards did not consistently support the Polish 
candidate for mayor, they are also more working-class environments. 
As to the second question, we showed that the Polish support of the 
machine reflected a lack of political incorporation for many Poles after the 
1930s. The rainbow theory of Chicago machine politics must be questioned 
in light of the political jobs and limited resources that the machine dispensed. 
Poles were the l~gest of the white-ethnic groups in Chicago but were given 
only a small share of top political positions in county and city governments. 
With the machine allocating up to 40% of these top jobs to the Irish, not only 
were Poles left out of a larger share but so were most other white, African-
American, and Hispanic groups in the city. Moreover, the county and city 
government jobs were but one aspect of machine resources that were dis-
proportionately given to the Irish. The Chicago machine also relied on the 
state and national governments to provide programs and fiscal assistance that 
could be used to enlarge the machine's resources and to reward groups 
according to their contribution to the minimal winning coalition. We find the 
rainbow theory to be an inadequate model for Chicago's politics during the 
Daley years and beyond. Alternatively, we believe that Erie's (1988) supply-
side, intergovernmental model is more appropriate to understanding machine 
politics during much of this period. 
We do not argue that the Poles were disproportionately discriminated 
against in the allocation of spoils in the Chicago machine. Rather, we believe 
that the Irish sought to harvest the lion's share of resources, especially top 
political positions, for themselves, thereby reducing the incorporation of 
most other groups into Chicago's political arrangements. The Poles were 
useful to observe because of their larger population proportion and because 
of the interesting electoral challenges by Polish leaders. From the 1970s 
onward the actions of the Irish-dominated machine must be viewed from the 
perspective of changing racial politics in the city. The political and socioeco-
nomic relationships between whites and African-Americans came to define 
the city's politics. Challenges to machine dominance by independent whites 
and African-Americans, the election of Harold Washington, and the white-
ethnic battles with minority leaders have all but rendered the Irish dominance 
of Chicago politics a moot point. 
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However, throughout the period that we examined, Poles did not fare as 
well as the Irish in local politics. This led to more independence in voting 
and displays of support for Polish candidates for major offices. Poles were 
not equal partners with the Irish in the operation of the machine. With political 
power disproportionately in the hands of Irish politicians, we conclude that 
the rainbow theory does not fit the experience of Chicago's Polish Americans. 
NOTES 
1. The positions that are reported here are all elective positions in Cook County government, 
Chicago government, the Metropolitan Sanitary District, and the top patronage appointive 
positions in these governments. We classified officeholders as Polish or Irish, according to their 
surnames. The data are taken from the Illinois Blue Book, published by the Illinois Secretary of 
State(1931,1935,1939,1945,1949,1955,1959,1965). The volumes stopped reporting detailed 
lists of major officials in later years. 
2. Population percentages for the Irish and Polish are drawn from the classification "foreign 
stock," which includes foreign-born residents, the native-born children of parents born in the 
same foreign country, the native-born children of parents born in different countries (classified 
according to the father's country of birth), and the native-born children of a native-born parent 
and a foreign-born parent (classified according to father's country of birth). The 1940 data were 
estimated from other information reported in the census. This is an accurate, although conser-
vative, measure of ethnic popUlations in a city. Even if one uses the self-identification data 
collected by census officials and sums both single and multiple ancestry, the Irish figures do not 
exceed 10%, and some multiple-ancestry individuals are completely ignored. The source for 
these data is City of Chicago (1976). 
3. Shakman v. The Democratic Organization of Cook County et al., no. 69 C 2145, U.S . 
District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. 
4. Since we do not have individual-level voting data, we can only speculate about a 
particular group's (such as the Poles) voting behavior during ward elections. 
5 . The Irish share of the population is based on foreign stock. 
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RACE AND VOTING 
Continuity and Change 
in the District of Columbia 
JEFFREY R. HENIG 
George Washington University 
Racially patterned voting can be spurious (based on racially neutral criteria), racist (based solely 
on race), or racial (tiased on political, tactical, symbolic, or value-based deliberations in which 
race is an important consideration). In this article the author assesses the relationship between 
race and voting in the 140 precincts of the District of Columbia, focusing on competitive eJec-
tions between 1978 and 1990. Race is an extremely potent and tenacious factor in structuring 
electoral patterns, but this reflects context-specific calculations mediated by strong group iden-
tity and shared assessments of the political environment. 
The growth of black majorities in a number of large American cities is one 
of the signal demographic shifts of recent decades, and it has been paralleled 
by a striking increase in the number of black officials. The demographic and 
the political changes, in large measure, go hand in hand. Of the 24 congres-
sional districts represented by blacks in 1990, only 2 had 1980 populations 
of more than 50% white, and all but 2 were located in large cities. In 1990, 
the 33 medium-to-Iarge cities with black mayors averaged 48.2% black and 
45.4% white. 1 
The tendency of white and black voters to support candidates of their own 
race has been pronounced. When running against white candidates, blacks 
who win office usually build their electoral coalitions on a core of nearly 
unanimous support from black voters. Where blacks continue to be a minority 
of the voting public-as in Los Angeles-electoral success has depended on 
expanding that coalition to include some liberal whites and other ethnic 
minorities. Opposition to black candidates often has been racially patterned 
as well; in some cases, the evidence suggests that some white citizens who 
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